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With this issue the Meadville Theological School Bulletin becomes the Meadville Journal. With the change in name goes also a change in policy. In the past the Bulletin was almost entirely the organ of the Meadville Theological School. Its articles were written by Meadville professors or visiting lecturers of the school. While the editorial supervision of the Meadville Journal will remain in the hands of the Meadville Faculty, its columns will be open to other writers in sympathy with the general programme of religious liberalism. The increased size of the Journal will make possible the use of a greater variety of articles than could be used in the past and it is hoped that the Meadville Journal may become a medium for writers who have something fresh to say on the many pressing problems of morals and religion.

Theodore Parker and Modern Theology*

By Professor Francis A. Christie, D. D.

The works of Theodore Parker are a treasure trove for the student of religion. So truly was he a genius in religion that whoever casts about for religious phenomena—not mere religious diction echoing a tradition, but the undeniable spontaneous responses of actual experience—can profitably find material for the scientific determination of the nature, meaning, and truth of religion in the rich and free effusion of this far from reticent man.

Like many a genius he was precocious, showing in very early years the activity of his dominant propensity. He could remember an involuntary and spontaneous play of religious consciousness in a childhood time that had as yet received no instruction from his elders. Parker correctly calls it "This nebulous period of religious history when the soul had emotions for which the mind could not frame adequate ideas." In *Aufsätze das Numinose Betreffend* Rudolf Otto has quoted the page as an instance of childhood's passage through the stage of humanity's primitive and as yet unrationalized religious experience. In his *Sermons of Religion* (Centenary Edition, p. 109), Parker says: "Perhaps a few of you remember a time when you had a sentiment—it was more a feeling than a thought—of a vague, dim, mysterious somewhat, which lay at the bottom of all things, was above all, about all, and in all, which you could not comprehend nor yet escape from. You wondered that you could not see with your eyes nor hear with your ears, nor touch with your hands, what you yet felt and longed after with such perplexity of indistinctness. Sometimes you loved it; sometimes you feared. You dared not name it, or if you did, no one word was name enough for so changeable a thing. Now you felt it in the sunshine, then in the storm; now it gave life, then it took life away. You connected it with all that was strange and uncommon; now it was a great loveliness, then an ugliness of indefinite deformity. In a new place you missed

*Address delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Unitarian Historical Society, in King's Chapel, Boston, May 24, 1928.

it at first; but it soon came back, traveling with the child, a constant companion at length." For psychological description this is an unsurpassed delineation of what we have learned from Otto to name the Numinous experience. It is an experience spontaneous, instinctive, not born of reflection. It is incapable of description in terms of a concrete notion; it is a thrill of shivering awe before an oppressive mystery, with an alternate vibration of joy in its fascination. It is a meeting with something that corresponds to a yearning of the heart, something strangely akin to one's own self though vested in "such perplexity of indistinctness." It is an intense awareness of a reality present and inescapable, an awareness occasioned—we cannot say caused—by a variety of provocations from the natural world. It is not a case of explanatory scientific thinking and neither is it a matter of ethical attitude. It is an experience pre-ethical, purely religious, though as such primitive. Parker shows his scientific insight by stressing the identity of such a childhood experience with the rude beginning of early man's awakening from savage lethargy. Savages, he says, are baby nations, still in this nebulous stage of religion (p. 110). So, often, as for instance, in *Lessons from the World of Matter and the World of Man* (pp. 30-31), in accordance with his thoroughgoing explanation by the principle of evolution, he sees religion beginning in this primitive irrational form and developing to its highest stage by a process of rationalizing and ethicizing this original Numinous discernment. This clear-sighted evolutionist tells us also that every individual man recapitulates the process of the race in swifter repetitions prior to adult life.[1] It is noticeable that Parker's own religious history is grounded in his awareness of this independent spiritual functioning in his being. When in the elementary district school he was forced to heed the traditional Calvinist theology of the New England Primer, though not yet eight years old, he "made way with that Primer, and with its grim God, and hell, and devil, and found rest for his soul in the spontaneous teachings of the religious sentiment sprung up in his heart."[2] So too, still in early boyhood, when he read the more congenial works of William Law,

1. *Sermons of Religion*, p. 112. *Matter and Spirit*, p. 245.
2. *Theism and Atheism*, p. 170.

Saint Teresa, Madame Guyon, Fénélon, he found at first a deep delight in their mysticism and could himself "sink down to this calm, blessed water, and pray and dream and rest in God." But the fusion of religious feeling with rational thought and ethical will—the mode of humanity's religious evolution—also began early with him and saved him from this "girlish feeling," as he called it, this passivity of dependence.[3] Early enough he recognized that the isolation of one human capacity means an "unhealthiness," an abnormality that may lead religion into perverted forms. Such is his criticism in maturer years.[4] True religion is normal life, not of one faculty alone, but of all in due coordination.[5] When he expounds the rapture of joy that men may have through religion, he insists that he means no ecstasy, no passing out of self, no being swallowed up in God.[6] Sometimes Parker is called a mystic. The word is ever ambiguous. Certainly he was never a mystic in the proper sense, the original sense, the sense applicable to Philo, or Plotinus, or Madame Guyon. The religious consciousness in which he grounds religion meant for him a wide awake normal state of human awareness and needed no justification by a theory of the replacement of man's self by the divine. Its justification was simply our inevitable presupposition of the validity of our normal faculties.[7]

It seems evident that the fundamental views of Parker in the bold modern construction of religious thought with which he amazed and disturbed his sedate contemporaries are due not to borrowings from his copious reading but primarily to his own clear and confident comprehension of his own developing life. When we use the clues given by his references in books, we discover that he is not after all a borrower. He is pointing to something analogous to his own original and independent insight, and it is increasingly clear that *his* insight is more fully consonant with the present day situation of the study of religion than the authorities whom he quotes. He himself seemed to relate his thought to certain of his contemporaries. It is far

3. *Matter and Man*, p. 343.
4. *Sermons of Religion*, pp. 220-f.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 223.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 235.
7. *Discourse of Religion*, p. 9, note.

more important to see relations to the further evolution of insight reached in our day.

Let us consider the position that was fundamental with him, his appeal to the religious consciousness as an original, irreducible, and normal functioning of men's being, the earliest and deepest of our activities of experience, so sovereign and regulative that to it is due the harmony and coordination in which lies our salvation. In this insistence Parker became an early advocate of a view which may be said to be now established in all modern religious psychology and has begun to affect the methods and conclusions of philosophy, though not every man yet keeps step with the regiment. An author of the moment, viewing the obvious distinction of two orders of reality —one of material mechanism, one of spiritual activity—inquires how we may know the full range of the spiritual realm and the gradations of the denizens inhabiting it. In antiquity, he notes, knowledge was supposed to come to us through earthly visitants in heaven returning with their tidings, or through heavenly residents manifesting themselves on earth, or through messages from above by voices or letters or signs or portents. All these proving to be myths, the sole remaining means of communication, in this author's view, is the ecstatic experience of certain privileged seers or prophets when the self has been supplanted by the divine presence.

We are familiar with this insistence on supernatural revelation. We know too the effort made to join with this the conclusions of philosophic reason. We remember the situation which was typical in Europe at the end of the eighteenth century, the pride of reason ignoring emotional awareness and resolving religion into logical propositions of the intellect; or the rebellious youth movement which asked revelation only through the aesthetic sensibility. Into this situation came Schleiermacher with his *Discourses on Religion* in 1799—a dithyrambic and triumphant assertion of the religious consciousness as an autonomous activity of the human spirit, distinct in nature from activities grounded in thought and will, and competent by its own immediacy of experience to spell our apprehension of the unseen realm. Furthermore he made the first great attempt at a modern scientific system of religious

propositions in his *Glaubenslehre* of 1821. Here he sought to derive all religious convictions from the autonomous religious experience now definitely described by him as a feeling of absolute dependence. Schleiermacher's main proposition is now victorious; though his analysis of religious consciousness as a feeling of absolute dependence has been found inadequate. It will not support the glowing expressions of religion in the *Reden* of 1799, and it will not justify all the expressions of the *Glaubenslehre* itself.

Parker's *Discourse of Religion* in 1842 has been conceived by some as a re-expression of Schleiermacher in English. This seems at first to have warrant by the fact that on an early page (p. 7) he says, "the religious element first manifests itself in our consciousness by a feeling of need, of want; in one word by *a sense of dependence.*" But when we study Parker we must conclude that this is only a young man's verbal deference to the great German champion of the autonomy of religious apprehension. That he was himself conscious of some dissatisfaction with the definition appears in the footnote which says that not all will agree with his analysis and that he is contending more for the fact of a religious element in man than for this analysis. The same hesitation is shown on page 9: "If it is regarded as a sense of absolute dependence." The misfit of the borrowed phrase is in any case evident by his making it equivalent to "a feeling of need, of want." That surely is a sense of humble inadequacy, a need of support, but not the sense of passivity to absolute infinite causative power which must be the meaning in Schleiermacher. Everything in fact which Parker proceeds to say about the independent religious experience is incongruous with the borrowed definition. So, for example, on page 34, he gives his own definition—reverence, trust, love—and here again his note betrays a conscious difference from Schleiermacher's definition. So again, in *Matter and Spirit,* page 235, he speaks of these innermost facts in religious consciousness, the feeling of weakness, sinfulness, dependence on somewhat; a feeling after what we may depend on and a finding of God; and thirdly a desire and struggle for union with God. Here again dependence does not mean what Schleiermacher meant. It means only that the human defect and the

human yearning can only be satisfied with the finding of the divine object. If any doubt remains we need only turn to the lyrical pages on *Solid Piety* in the *Discourse*[8] to see that the German formula makes no provision for Parker's understanding of the religious experience. We must cease to make him rhyme with Schleiermacher. I myself once sought to make Parker indebted to Fries and De Wette, but the debt proves to be small. Parker was indebted to himself. In the *Discourse* he makes quite apparent that he reads religious consciousness by self-inspection and by his own survey of religious systems. In this truly scientific procedure he had entered on the path which is now the main traveled road. What he presented in cursory fashion before the immense labors of an army of scientific scholars, seems now like a prophecy of what we read in Hauer's *Die Religionen, ihr Werden, ihr Sinn, ihre Wahrheit.*

In any effort to give historical location to Parker we are now brought to another matter, important and not without difficulty. That he showed psychological acuteness with results in harmony with the more advanced knowledge of our time is apparent. Equally clear is the fact that he was not guilty of the psychologism now rather prevalent in our country and undermining to the faith of many. I mean, of course, the psychology which describes religious phenomena as a mere play of consciousness and feels no need to explain them by a divine contact with human consciousness—an actual finding of God. We are driven to ask what was Parker's theory of knowledge. Theories of knowledge have their torment and a philosopher is seldom satisfied with the vocabulary and diction of any other man in dealing with the subject. It is not surprising that Parker's terminology should give us some trouble. His was the case of a young man accustomed to hear matters of philosophy expressed in the terms of Locke, but a man deeply affected by his new and hasty acquaintance with the great German movement that began with Kant, with authors who had their own inconsistencies of expression. Of one thing we may be sure. If he were explaining himself here today he would range himself with our contemporary Realists. The man who wrote[9] "the

8. pp. 129-137.
9. *Discourse*, p. 10.

senses reveal to us something external to the body and independent thereof, on which it depends" was certainly some kind of Realist. He was a Realist of the kind that asserts the objectivity of more than spatially extended things, of subsistences as well as existences, to use the expression popular with some. Parker spoke and wrote before all our attempts at expression had been subjected to severe criticism. We must allow him a certain colloquial ease of diction. If he speaks of religious "sentiment" or "feeling" we are not to understand a mere surge of emotion, just as we have all learned to read Schleiermacher's *Gefühl* as a word not for emotion but for direct, unreflecting, intuitive awareness.[10] Both Parker and Schleiermacher mean "sensing" a reality, though the sensing is not by the physical senses. Parker translated the German *Gefühl* by "a sense of dependence."

He was not, however, occupied with any detailed theory of knowledge, and an occasional looseness of his phraseology betrays some confusion of the usage of Locke with that of the Germans. This is particularly the case with his use of the term "idea." When he says that the idea of God is implied in the religious sentiment, or[11] that "the religious consciousness implies its object," he might be understood as meaning that from certain feelings active in man we may logically infer a divine object, logically form a conception of that object. But he goes on to speak of the "conception" of God as something different from the "idea" and later than the idea. We are driven to believe that in this case and some others he is using the term idea in the sense of Locke for an object apprehended. What he means then by sentiment implying an object is that the religious consciousness has a direct awareness of an existent reality. So on page 13 he speaks distinctly of "intuitive perception" so fundamental to our knowledge of God. This is the Realism of that Numinous experience of his childhood, the "feeling of a vague dim, mysterious somewhat" not comprehended yet inescapable. On the same page 13, he tells us that "the idea of God . . . is given by intuition, or natural revelation, which comes of the joint and spontaneous action of reason and the

10. Cf. R. Otto, *West-Oestliche Mystik*. pp. 334 ff. 383 ff.
11. *Discourse*, p. 9.

religious element." This certainly means that in the experience there is recognition of a present reality through the functioning of the religious capacity, and the determination of that reality as divine by virtue of an *a priori* of reason, like Otto's use of the category of the Holy as an *a priori* condition of religious experience. Only as an affirmation of an *a priori* can we understand his utterance on page 10; outer circumstances occasion the discovery "of the idea of God but they do not furnish the idea itself. That is a fact given by the nature of man." Whether or not the word "idea" changes its meaning, as I must believe it does, from a Lockian sense in the first sentence to a Kantian sense of *Idee* in the second, we are made perfectly clear that the divine reality is discovered, not excogitated or inferred. Some startling object or event in nature stirs into action the latent *a priori* activity of our being to find the mysterious and majestic presence of the divine. The occasions that thus stimulate the spiritual perception are as varied as the contents of nature. Nature, he says, is the rosary of men's prayer. But the rosary is only stimulus and reminder. "Finding the idea," "discovering the idea" are only ways of naming a direct experience of the divine presence as a given reality.

With this understanding of an experience which has a determinate character by virtue of a deep interest or need belonging to the human spirit, we have light on Parker's thought of the historical evolution of the religious consciousness from a primitive stage to the full clarified form which he names Absolute Religion. To begin with, it is, in Bergson's term, a knowledge of acquaintance, an intuitive discernment of a present reality. But why is this a religious experience, not, for example, an aesthetic experience, or one that will end in scientific relating under class or law? An attitude, an interest—something integral to the human spirit—helps to determine the character of the experience as well as to make it possible. What is this *a priori,* this presupposition of that type of experience? In his emphasis on the original experience as irrational and on an irrational residuum surviving even in the developed experience, Rudolf Otto expounds his *a priori,* the Holy, as a recognition of what is utter mystery, an inexplicable "wholly other." Otto, of course, agrees that the idea of the divine has been rationalized

and ethicized in religious development, but his account of matters has raised the question whether the thrill of awe before the mystery of the "wholly other" admits legitimately of rationalizing and ethicizing. Would not the rational notion be extraneous to the experience? Now and again we hear suggestions of discarding rational reflection as a means of getting religion, as if the rationalizing had been a mistake. How indeed do we pass from the humble shrinking before vastness of power to trustful allegiance with supreme goodness? Accordingly J. E. Turner[12] will not admit this inaccessible "wholly other" of mystery as exclusively the character of the Holy and he understands the Holy as the Infinite, the Complete, the Perfect, or, using the philosopher's word, the Absolute. This is in fact asking Otto to return to his discipleship to the school of Jacob Friedrich Fries and De Wette—a current thought with which Parker was familiar. In that mode of thought the principle of *Vollendung* is determinative of all quests of the human spirit—the need of an absolute whole or perfect.

Certainly this was Parker's *a priori* element conditioning the religious awareness in its first manifestation and in the course of its refined development. When some unusual and impressive scene or event serves as occasion and stimulus, we are aware of a more than sensuous greatness through a perception conditioned by a dim latent relationship of our being to what is supreme, complete, and sovereign in worth. As he tells us in *Matter and Spirit,* p. 33, whatever makes us conscious of ourselves as finite unfolds the idea of the infinite in us. The religious consciousness, therefore, involves an element that is educable. It directs us to an Infinite, a Complete, a Perfect, an Absolute, if you will, and although that transcends our power of completely adequate representation, it is not inaccessible or wholly incomprehensible. We have a secure comprehension of it by intensifying our higher ideas of wisdom, love, goodness, power. These open out into infinity. Our conception of the perfect and complete worth grows with our advance to the truth that thought intends, the love that the heart would bestow and receive, the good and the right that our wills propose. It grows with all our knowledge of the world of worth, of value. The

12. *The Nature of Deity,* pp. 158, 150.

perfected religious life then acts in response to a highly elaborated reflective idea of the Infinite and Perfect God, and it is not necessarily mere worship or ethical behavior but the harmonized life of all our capacities, or, as Parker said, "normal life, not of one faculty alone, but of all in due coordination."[13]

The knowledge that began as knowledge of acquaintance has perfected and enriched itself by all our developments of thought and we can speak of religion, therefore, in terms of thought, belief, conviction, faith, for thought it is that enables us to be explicit about our mighty relationship. This does not mean, with Parker, any complete intellectualizing of religion, a transformation into forms of discursive thought. Even on this advanced cultural stage the intuitive awareness of the divine presence is still the human privilege in rare and blessed hours, but now, of course, permeated by what has been won in fuller realization of the infinitely perfect. The perplexing indistinctness of the first Numinous experience is replaced by a vision of Deity clothed with truth and love and beauty. Frequently Parker's expressions remind us of Windelband's over individual divine or Normal Consciousness controlling our blundering finite consciousness with the constraint to think as it thinks and act as it acts. This is the philosopher's presupposition which must be acknowledged if anything is to have universal validity, but religion is not such a mere postulate. Religion as shown in life is "the normal consciousness of the true, the good, the beautiful, deeply and emotionally *experienced as objective reality"—erlebt als transcendente Wirklichkeit.* This is what Parker preached in more glowing diction. *The Sermons of Religion* (1852) may surely rank as a religious classic for the depth and tenderness of its expressions of the experience where thought and conscience and affections and the soul's power of direct perception all act in conscious communion with Deity.

This degree of rationalizing the thought of God does not mean the complete loss of mystery. Parker speaks of deeper depths where reason goes not.[14] Though wisdom, love, goodness meet at their highest in God; though from the necessity of such perfection in God Parker *deduces* unfaltering trust in a

13. *Sermons of Religion*, p. 223.
14. *Matter and Man*, p. 63.

perfect providence of good for mankind and individual men; though prayer is the inevitable natural speech of man to an infinite Father, Parker refuses to say that in our finitude we have a complete comprehension of God. For him too there is a residuum of mystery, of what may transcend our powers of realization, and with this sense of the veil of shadow hiding the light we may not see he rejects the term personal as applied to Deity. Enough that we can love and adore. So too though we deduce the conviction of a perfect providence of good we are not enabled to make its way a plain and simple explanation of life's struggles and tragedies in detail. Baron von Hügel[15] has told us of his thirst for a fully thought-out Critical Realism, to assure us "that thought, primarily and normally, never stands alone and never is thought of thought, but always thought of a reality distinct from this thinking of it" and to assure us in particular that religious experience is an immediate reception of the divine presence. In every quarter we find this demand for objectivity. There is no doubt that Parker in his aphoristic and assertive fashion was expressing this kind of Realism; being thereby in harmony with the main current of thought in our time. What else indeed can be the meaning of the important section of the *Discourse* which deals with Inspiration as universal for all men, not limited to religious truth, and enjoyed in proportion to our own free effort of will. This is but an aspect of his conviction of divine immanence. To speak of divine action, inspiration, revelation in every play of the world upon us is but the converse of the Realism which declares that every form of consciousness is a dealing with realities, transsubjective, transcendent, though immanent in our knowledge. Inspiration, revelation are unfortunate terms for his meaning. He means simply that the divine is immanent in man's spiritual life. Since God is omnipresent and omni-active there is a regular mode of his action on conscious spirits, an action not miraculous or exceptional but following a law as certain, regular, and universal as gravitation.[16] Without giving us a metaphysical solution of the problem involved, he insists that the divine action does not destroy man's freedom.[17] It is

15. *Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of Religion*, p. 189.
16. *Discourse*, p. 191.
17. *Discourse*, p. 196.

coextensive with the faithful use of man's natural powers.[18] "No doubt," he adds, "there is mystery in it, as in sensation, as in all the functions of man." And in this divine action there are degrees which are again the degrees of the human susceptibility through our degrees of ascent to purity and obedience. There are times when reflection becomes conscious experience of God, such experience as may come in the prayer which is no conventional form. Rare indeed are these hours and happy is he that has ten such in a life time.[19]

In this effort to see Parker's treatment of the religious consciousness in the light afforded by recent progress in the study of religion I have carefully avoided the use of the term Transcendentalism. It is true that Parker penned a lecture on Transcendentalism and meant it as an explanation of his own thought. But both in his own day and in ours the term meant and means to most people something vague and bewildering. It is a mistake to use it now in connection with Parker. As I have already said, he was a philosophic Realist and that name brings him close to the present hour. Parker began his account of Transcendentalism by saying: "In physics it starts with the maxim that the senses acquaint us actually with the body and therefrom the mind gives us the idea of substance, answering to an objective reality."[20] It would be difficult to apply to this any term but Realism. He maintains also that the physical universe is a mechanism, an automatic mechanism[21] but as such functioning for the purposes of a divine intelligence. It is an evolving world, however, and we have even[22] the idea of Henderson's *Fitness of the Environment*, the idea that the evolution of the inorganic world as a pure mechanism must yet be interpreted by virtue of the proportions of its chemical ingredients as an evolution aiming at living organisms. We can attach also to many of Parker's phrases the particular view of Emergent Evolution now found so illuminating. Student of Newton, Laplace, Leverrier, Lyell, our Transcendentalist was not a man lost in the fog of a speculative imagination but essen-

18. *Discourse*, p. 201.
19. *Discourse*, pp. 204, 205.
20. *Matter and Spirit*, p. 24.
21. *Matter and Man*, pp. 3, 5, 345, 381, 283-4.
22. *Theism and Atheism*, p. 69.

tially a scientist, a scientific Realist. But he was also a Realist who assimilated all that is essential to a sane Idealism—the Idealism that as Hoernle says "affirms the reality of spiritual experience and treats the world of sense-perception as exhibiting its full nature only in the context of that experience."[23] His view of nature was that of the astronomer, the physicist, the geologist. Without using the word evolution, which was not yet in use, he made constant and complete use of the principle of evolution. He was a master of the methods of critical historical understanding of ancient Scripture and what we call Comparative Religion was his before the treatises were written. He was a prophet of our modernism and we may find him one of its best exponents. I wish to speak briefly of another feature of his thought which should commend him to certain men supposed to be standing on the last steps of time. Parker had a highly absorbent intelligence, but what he absorbed was assimilated to the logic and structure and movement of his own mind. Inevitably his hand shared—rather should we say led—a general movement highly characteristic of the recent past but even as yet hardly more than adolescent.

It is clear that the Constitution of the United States and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man began a new epoch in history. They marked a new attitude of the social mind. They meant that instead of merely accepting a social order legitimated by a sacrosanct inheritance men would now begin to devise freely a rational and ethical scheme of society. This certainly implies that man has a creative power and a creative responsibility. That this new development is a real modern dynamic of epoch-making significance is clear from the fact that it extended beyond the sphere of politics. It invaded the economic life. It has gradually found expression in the church, both Catholic and Protestant. Christian men have begun to say in increasing numbers and with increasing confidence that the whole social system could be reconstructed as an expression of Christian ethics, and that man by his freedom and his dominance over nature was commissioned to create the Kingdom of God on earth instead of waiting for the miracle of its advent from Heaven. The Copec conferences, the Stockholm conference,

23. *Idealism*, p. 137.

are recent exhibitions of this historical movement, this new emergence in social evolution. The attitude found a remarkable expression from the lips of Abiel Livermore, who preached that man was the vice-gerent of God on earth. Open the pages of Parker. You find the modern emphasis on philanthropy. You find a passion for specific reforms. You find a crusader against slavery, against intemperance, a crusader for education and the rights of women. But you find also this deeper and wider idea; that man can and should make his own paradise.[24] Parker's insistence on the relative freedom of the human will, a freedom ever increasing in the course of our evolution, means just this grand responsibility, this commission to create, this office as vice-gerent of God. God did not make the great world of nature, he said, "as the background to a little dwarfish picture of spirit. The great power of nature, the great beauty of nature, and its great sense, are all prophetic of a power, beauty, and sense which matter knows not of, which it will take great men and great generations of great men to fulfill and accomplish. But it will one day be." So he prophesied "a great human world that is to come."[25] A human task, you see. "Ask a miracle of God, and there is no answer. The world is the answer, and it lies before us. Ask the result by thought and work, and the result comes."[26] To bring our social ideal to pass, he says, "God does His part by creating us with faculties fit for this glorious destination. To use these powers and opportunities, it is not God's work, it is yours and mine."[27] The result would be "a family of equals, a community without want, without ignorance, without crime, a Church of righteousness, and a State where the intuitions of conscience have been codified into statutes." [28] Man is on earth, he tells us, to develop all his powers, to become a complete man; the purpose of society is to help furnish the means thereto.[29] And this great humanistic programme of existence is the purport of Christianity. "The religious word must become religious flesh." "The ideal which

24. *Matter and Man*, p. 285.
25. *Matter and Man*, pp. 4, 5.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 25.
27. *Transient and Permanent*, p. 419.
28. *Matter and Man*, p. 29.
29. *Sins and Safeguards of Society*, pp. 53, 54.

hovers, lofty or low, above the heads of our nation, is the Christian ideal, the stature of the perfect man in Christ Jesus. Christianity, then is the ideal our nation is striving to realize in life; the sublime prophecy we are laboring to fulfill." This social meaning of Christianity found detailed discussion in volumes that still feed thought and inspire action—such volumes as *Social Classes in a Republic* and *Sins and Safeguards of Society*. In his fragmentary and passionate *Autobiography* p. 38, he cries, "Christianity is humanity." I discover no quotation of Herder's name, but Herder's dominant idea of *Humanität* as the world's end and aim and Herder's contention that *Humanität* is the purport of Christianity found new utterance in that cry. Parker was a great Humanist just as he was a great Theist. He speaks for today and he speaks for the future.

The Challenge of Science to Man's Self-Esteem

Professor Robert J. Hutcheon, D. D.

(1) *The Nature of Man's Self-Esteem*

What man thinks of himself, at any period of time, is both a fact in the history of his speculation and a dynamic factor in the shaping of his conduct. It is this power of his thought over his deed that makes him a man. No species below man can make itself the object of reflection and then quicken or retard the pace of its own life by the outcome of that reflection. Animal desires are not subject to the great fluctuations which imagination excites and, therefore, when the environment remains stable, an animal species can persist with few changes over long stretches of time. Indeed it is probable that the dynamic quality of human life—due to self-consciousness and egoistic self-assertion—which fills man's days with unceasing change, has been itself the outcome of a long evolution and that at the beginning no spark much disturbed the human clod. But, whenever and however self-consciousness arrived, it became, when it did arrive, an active factor in the ongoing process of human experience. Philosophers have been prone to think of consciousness as a mere spectator, mirroring life without taking part in it, but the voluntaristic psychology has corrected that mistake. Consciousness is more than mere awareness: it is awareness alert, lying in wait and selective, and motivated by the clamorous wants of the whole organism. And when consciousness has achieved a practical *philosophy of life,* that philosophy has become a factor in the motivation and the enterprise of life itself. What man imagines himself to be, acts either as a depressing or an exhilarating agency in the concrete process of living.

On the whole, man has managed to think fairly well of himself. Someone has recently called him an incorrigible narcissist and not without a show of reason. His attitude towards the lower animals, throughout the historical period at least, has shown, until recently, no slightest inkling of the truth that, in spite of his real superiority, he is just a later product of the same evolutionary process which produced them. Ordinarily we manage to conceal our narcissistic tendencies but under the

strain of abnormality they come to the surface in the shape of delusions of grandeur, ego-mania, superiority-complexes, and insane egotisms. All the normal excesses of the ego-sentiment such as vanity, conceit, pride, arrogance, ostentation, love of domination, tyranny, etc., show how easy it is for man to "think more highly of himself than he ought to think." His religion has sometimes humbled him in the dust and forced from him the humiliating confession of the Psalmist (Psalm 51:5): "In sin did my mother conceive me," and the despairing cry of St. Paul: "Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" (Romans 7:24) but, on the whole, religion has brought about a vast expansion of the ego —indeed has projected the ego on to the universe at large. Consider the words put into the mouth of God in Genesis 1:26,27; "And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: . . . so God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he man; male and female created he them." Religious people have generally interpreted these words with naive literalness and, therefore, have not detected in them any egotistic boastfulness. But, as now interpreted by Biblical scholars, they express the highly optimistic, not to say flattering, conception of man and his place in the universe at which some early religious thinker had arrived. The same naive and jubilant note is struck by the author of the eighth Psalm: "When I consider thy heavens, the work of thy fingers, the moon and the stars which thou hast ordained, what is man that thou art mindful of him? and the son of man that thou visitest him? For thou hast made him a little lower than the angels and hast crowned him with glory and honor. Thou madest him to have dominion over the works of thy hand; thou hast put all things under his feet." It need not be inferred that these verses express the feeling of all the contemporaries of their authors. The majority of people have always been too poor, too dependent, too timid, too ignorant, to indulge in soaring egotisms. It was probably among the upper classes—the priests, poets, warriors, rulers and men of wealth—that any conscious philosophy of life originated. Such persons were prepared by the positive self-feeling which their position in society stimulated and justified to utter their self-confidence in such words (if they could

have commanded them) as those of Hamlet: "What a piece of work is a man! How noble in reason! How infinite in faculty! in form and movement how express and admirable! in action how like an angel! in apprehension how like a God! the beauty of the world! the paragon of animals!" No doubt even the self-confident have sometimes found it hard to hold permanently in their minds such a conception of human nature in the face of the concrete facts—every civilization has produced its pessimists and they have loved to prick the bubble of man's boastfulness. But a pessimist is generally a disappointed optimist and his withering scorn of man testifies to the strength of the hopes concerning man that have been disappointed.

Moreover, these brilliant poetical outbursts are not our only evidence of man's naive, uncritical self-confidence. The sober prose of his cosmology and his theology tells the same story. It would be absurd to suppose that the Ptolemaic astronomy which represented the earth as the centre of the solar system grew out of man's sense of his own importance. The apparent immobility of the earth and the apparent movement of the sun around it seemed to offer a solid empirical foundation for the orthodox astronomy. But at least men exploited that astronomy for their own glory. They thought that the purpose of the sun was to lighten and warm the earth for man's sake; that the stars were hung out as lanterns to brighten man's path in the darkness; that plants and animals had been created to supply food for man; and that, as the earth was the centre of the universe, so was man the centre of the earth. Their opposition to the Copernican astronomy was ostensibly based on its contradictions of Holy Scripture but their real hostility to it grew out of their angry feeling that it lowered man in his own eyes by removing him from that central place in the universe which he had supposed himself to occupy. The Ptolemaic astronomy was, therefore, not only geocentric but anthropocentric as well.

The theology of Calvin which has had so wide and so prolonged an influence in the Protestant world seems on the surface to be a severe blow at the natural egotism of the human race. Does it not teach that man is born in iniquity and sin? that he can do nothing of himself to save his own soul? that

the great majority of men are doomed to spend eternity in the avenging fires of hell? Does it not picture poor, weak, sinful man as prostrate in the dust before the avenging wrath of a just and Sovereign God? Yes: all these beliefs are a part of Calvinism. But they are based on a deeper conception which is essentially optimistic and it is this element which has given to Calvinism the mighty strength it has had for three hundred years. Man, as Calvinism sees him, *is* a sinner but he has fallen from a high estate; he has committeed an *infinite* sin for which nothing but an infinite sacrifice can atone; he is so significant a being that God and Devil contend with one another for the possession of his soul; his sin is such a challenge to the power of God that only an eternity in hell can be an adequate punishment for it; those who have been elected by God to salvation are raised by His choice of them to the estate of sons and daughters of the most High and acclaimed as prospective Angels and Archangels. By thus conceiving human nature in cosmic terms and by representing the struggle of God and the Devil for man's soul as the great cosmic drama, Calvinism put man on an almost royal throne. To be deemed significant enough to deserve the eternal punishment of Calvin's hell was in itself a mighty compliment. Compared with a recent description of the human animal as "a crawling earthworm struggling to be a man," Calvin's fallen sinner is a striking and heroic figure.

We see, then, that before the impact of modern science on the Western world, man had attained a conception of himself which, while recognizing the evils to which his nature was prone, was essentially optimistic, if not egotistic. He took literally the statement that he had been made in God's image; he considered the salvation of his soul to be the central motive of the cosmic drama; he projected his life without any hesitation beyond the grave into a future of eternal bliss or eternal woe. When John Milton selected a topic for an epic in which he hoped to rival Homer and Virgil, he chose the fall of man as the most significant event in cosmic history prior to the coming of Christ. For Milton as for Calvin the fate of the human soul was the central problem of the universe.

(2) *The Challenge of the Copernican Astronomy*

With the establishment of the Copernican astronomy by Kepler and Galileo, which revealed the earth as merely one of the smaller planets in the solar system, the old self-confidence of man was profoundly shaken. His universe seemed to have fallen in ruins round about him. With the collapse of the old theological view which made him the centre of the universe, he had to adjust his thought and feeling to a science which visioned the world as infinitely extended in space and time and conceived of man as "no longer the final cause of the universe, the heaven-descended heir of all the ages" but as a mere accident, and of human history as "a brief and transitory episode in the life of one of the meanest of the planets." No one has painted this tragic fall of man from the central place in the universe in darker colors than Bertrand Russell; "The universe as astronomy reveals it is very vast. How much there may be beyond what our telescopes show, we cannot tell; but what we can know is of unimaginable immensity. In the visible world the Milky Way is a tiny fragment; within this fragment the solar system is an infinitesimal speck, and of this speck our planet is a microscopic dot. On this dot, tiny lumps of impure carbon and water, of complicated structure, with somewhat unusual physical and chemical properties, crawl about for a few years, until they are compounded. Natural convulsions periodically destroy some thousands or millions of them, and disease prematurely sweeps away many more. In the life of the solar system, the period during which the existence of man will have been physically possible is a minute portion of the whole; but there is some reason to hope that even before this period is ended man will have set a term to his own existence by his efforts at mutual annihilation. Such is man's life viewed from the outside." Bertrand Russell has expressed a much more cheerful view of man and his place in the universe in his more recent book "Philosophy" but we may use his earlier views here quoted as typical of the outlook of science prior to the work of Einstein, Eddington, Whitehead, Millikan, Rutherford and many other scientists during the last decade.

The obvious implication of the outlook of this older type of science is that man must efface himself before the immensities

of the external world. To the materialistic scientist the self-confidence of the writer of the creation-story and the eighth Psalm is a mere delusion of grandeur. Self-pity rather than self-confidence, he feels, is the only attitude consistent with the facts, and self-pity tends to slip over into self-scorn and a nihilistic attitude towards all human values. Such is the inevitable outcome of applying a common measure to the immensities of the physical universe, of its space and time and matter and energy on the one hand and to the tiny mass, the puny strength and the brief life of man on the other. Studied from the outside by the methods of physical science and alongside of the other objects with which physical science deals man shrinks, as Bertrand Russell says, to a "tiny lump of impure carbon and water." If there were no other method of apprehending the significance of man than that of physical science, the knowledge of his own nothingness would sooner or later make reflection and the higher life impossible. Man's natural egotism needs the chastening which the astronomical and physical sciences administer but when he is chastened to the point of humiliation, disillusionment and disenchantment, not only is his mind "sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought" but the practical energy of his spirit is paralyzed and his emotional nature is impoverished for lack of any object worthy of its attachment.

(3) *The Challenge of Darwinism*

The second great shock to the modern man's sense of his own significance came from the work of Darwin. Many persons still living have felt in their own minds the violent agitation and the horrified dismay which the theory of evolution aroused for a few decades after it was first given to the world. In many ways the effect of Darwinism was more painful and depressing than that of the Copernican astronomy. While the latter dethroned man from his high place in the physical universe, it left undisturbed his sense of complete superiority to all the animal species around him. True, the same divine Creator who had made man had also made the lower animals, but it was believed that a sharp line of demarkation had been drawn between the human order and the animal order. Animals had

been made after their own kind but man had been made in the image of God and had been given authority, by the Creator himself, over all other creatures. So long as man was able to accept without hesitation the creation-story of Genesis and to regard himself as from the beginning a special creation and the object of special divine solicitude, he could hold up his head in spite of being implicated in the sin and guilt of Adam. Adam *had* made a fatal choice and involved the whole human race in sin's consequences but Adam, nevertheless, had come straight from the creative hand of God and carried, even in his ruined nature, traces of his divine origin. Moreover, Adam belonged to a far distant past; his sin was of such a non-realistic kind that the imagination could not be very painfully impressed by it; the fear which the Church tried to inspire by its theological interpretation of the meaning of Adam's fall for the human race was for the most part of the scarecrow variety; all sorts of aristocracies, caste systems and priestly hierarchies had grown up under the shadow of the doctrine of the universal sinfulness of man; and so it came to pass that, in spite of Adam's fall, men felt themselves secure in their proud sense of superiority to all the lower animals. Man had been made after the image of God, animals only after their own kind; man had reason, animals had only instincts; man had a soul, animals had not; man was free or by divine Grace might become free, animals were determined by their bodily mechanisms; man was immortal, animals completely ceased to be with the death of the body. And all these beliefs were guaranteed, not by mere reason working with limited and uncertain empirical materials, but by a special divine revelation contained in the Bible or the Church or both.

Upon the natural self-sufficingness of man, fortified thus in his sense of superiority by divine revelation, the teachings of Darwin and succeeding evolutionists fell like a bomb dropped from the sky. The theological dogmatists were too angry to consider the evidence on which those teachings were based and protected themselves against them by loud denunciation. But more open-minded, imaginative and sensitive persons could not thus protect their spiritual dignity. They were much impressed with the evidences on which the theory of evolution was based

but they could not resist the feeling that the mental and spiritual elements in human nature, hitherto regarded as unique, were brought under suspicion by the new doctrine of continuity between the human and animal species. Those who opposed evolution because they felt their dignity ruffled or their theological prejudices attacked made much of the genetic relationship which, as was supposed, Darwin had postulated between man and the monkey, and by thus caricaturing the theory made the whole situation more painful for those who could not refute the evidence but shrank from the conclusions to which it seemed to force them. Though Darwin himself did not overstress Natural Selection as a factor in the evolutionary process, many of his followers came to regard it as the only factor and this gave a decidedly mechanistic turn to the whole theory. The present-day conception of evolution as creative or emergent or epigenetic had very little vogue, if any, in the eighties and nineties of the last century. The philosophy of Herbert Spencer, which was essentially mechanistic, was regarded by the general public outside of the universities almost as an official and definitive interpretation of evolution into philosophical terms. All this made the task of adjustment to the new theory more difficult for those imaginative and sensitive spirits who were too intelligent and too honest to fall back on mere prejudice and dogma. They were ready to believe that the theory of evolution was a genuinely new insight but they were warned by the paralyzing effect of the current interpretation of it on their own minds that something was wrong somewhere.

Two aspects of this mechanical interpretation of evolution were especially depressing. The first was its reductive tendency. It leveled the highest down to the lowest rather than lifted the lowest to the highest. Instead of spiritualizing the universe to its tiniest fragments as current monadism or panpsychism does, it attempted to interpret the highest in the terms of the lowest. The highest was just the lowest over again, only more complicated, and a complete knowledge of the lowest would have enabled one to predict the highest. There were no genuine novelties, no really new qualities in the whole process. What had been regarded as unique qualities were reduced, or were believed to be reducible, to mere changes of quantity. The

differences between levels or between species on the same level were thought to be more apparent than real. Current science was intent on samenesses, uniformities, identities and similarities and practically denied the importance of differences. In this way most of the differences between man and animals which had been stressed before Darwin lost their significance. Man was no longer referred to as having been "made in the image of God." He was discovered to have as many instincts as the animals. Reason was declared to be a very feeble element in man's total life. Fate rather than freedom was found to be the secret of human as well as of animal conduct. The immortality of the soul lost its meaning if the soul was only an epiphenomenon or a complex of reflexes and instincts. The leveling-down process plainly jeopardized man's long-cherished belief that he possessed unique moral, intellectual and spiritual qualities which set him apart, once and forever, from other animal species.

The second aspect of the evolution-theory which sensitive souls found especially depressing was its apparent reestablishment of the cruel competitive process in the affairs of men. "Natural Selection" was made to look very much like the ancient Moloch. Only the best should survive, it was taught, and relentless slaughter of the weaker groups was deemed necessary to the survival of the best. Among the Socialists, the old, kindly, cooperative, Utopian, humanistic type of reform-ideology was abandoned for the Marxian or scientific type and this type stressed the struggle of classes as inevitable and regarded the survival of the proletariat as the work of destiny. Man as a creative individual was absorbed into the mass-movement and given only such a place as was consistent with the inevitability of that movement. War was regarded not only as inevitable but also as desirable—without its selection, the race would decline both physically and morally. Nations were encouraged to arm to the teeth, for no moral, cooperative, international process would ever be able, so it was believed, to secure for any one group all that its destiny demanded. International Peace Conventions, Hague Tribunals and World Courts were idle and meaningless gestures. Before the stern necessities of natural selection all treaties would prove but scraps of paper

and all the agreements for the humanizing of war would be quickly forgotten. Such was the interpretation of neo-Darwinism in terms of international relations. With such ideas dominating the outlook of the hard-boiled, tough-minded, aggressive evolutionists, the sensitive, imaginative, intelligent idealist was hard pressed. He could not fall back on the old creation-story of Genesis but it seemed impossible for him to accept evolution as currently interpreted and still retain his old values with any strong sense of their security or with any unshaken conviction of their demonstrable validity. He became, as Matthew Arnold put it: "A wanderer between two worlds—one dead, the other powerless to be born."

(4) *The Challenge of Freudianism and Behaviorism*

With the turn of the century a new challenge to man's self-esteem was trumpeted from the clinic and the classroom of Dr. S. Freud in Vienna. In many ways the new psychology was more humiliating and disillusioning than either the Copernican astronomy or the Darwinian theory of descent. Even if the earth was not the centre of the universe and man was not the centre of the earth, human dignity was still possible within man's more limited sphere. Even if man was genetically related to the lower animals and especially to the anthropoid apes, there were many noble animals with which man need not feel ashamed to be distantly allied. These movements of scientific thought were disconcerting only because they resulted in a new conception of man's environment and of his genealogy. But the account of human nature which Freud was broadcasting was humiliating for an entirely different reason. Freud had no special interest in the problem of man's place in the universe or in his genealogical tree: his one concern was to discover what man is *now*, and he and his disciples thought that, by the method of psycho-analysis, they had unearthed unsavory facts about the real nature of man which, when frankly faced, would strip from him the last vestige of pretense and egotism. They did not stop to reflect that the patients out of whose Unconscious they had dug these unsavory facts were abnormal—to a large extent perhaps the product of the chaotic, interracial, intercultural life of Vienna before the war—but pro-

ceeded to deduce from their study of abnormals all sorts of inferences concerning normal humanity. Moreover, as Dr. Pierre Janet, a teacher of the youthful Freud, hints, Freud was unduly eager to exploit his findings for purposes not strictly scientific. In his "Principles of Psychotherapy" (P. 46) Janet writes: "Psychoanalysis is today the last incarnation of those practices at once magical and psychological that characterized magnetism. It maintains the same characteristics, the use of imagination and the lack of criticism, the vaulting ambition, the contagious fascination, the struggle against orthodox science." That is to say, Freud has given offense to or rather produced a depressing effect on, sensitive natures, both by the sordidness of the aspects of human nature which he thinks he has discovered and by the noisy publicity which he has given them.

The most disillusioning element in his view of human nature is his doctrine of pan-sexuality. What makes this doctrine offensive is not only its own excess but to a certain degree the fact that the all-pervading character of sex has been hidden from us until the last two decades by the Christian tradition in which we have been reared. It is no doubt a delusion, as Mrs. Charlotte Gilman suggests (Sex in Civilization p. 113), to think that our silence and our ignorance concerning sex are derived from our Puritan ancestors—"their mighty families and buried wives gave no evidence of self-restraint"—but within the Christian world many forces have conspired to conceal from us the influence of unconscious sex in shaping the growing life of the child, the ramifications of the sex-impulse in play, art, music, poetry, and religion, and the importance of unfulfilled sex-desires and unsatisfactory sex-experiences in producing the psychoneuroses which form so large a part of human pathology today. Few readers of Freud, therefore, were prepared to acknowledge the elements of truth in his doctrine of pan-sexuality and the excess of that doctrine awakened a profound disgust in those who rejected it and a profound depression in most of those who felt compelled to accept it.

No part of the doctrine was more unacceptable than that concerning infantile sexuality. In the Christian world the innocence of the child had been accepted without question. Words-

worth's line to the effect that "trailing clouds of glory do we come from God who is our home" was widely known and warmly welcomed. The beautiful teaching of Jesus concerning childhood: "Suffer the little children to come unto me and forbid them not, for of such is the Kingdom of Heaven" had sunk deep into the minds of most Christian parents. The glamour of poetry and sentiment had been cast over the early years of life and it was supposed to be the duty of parents and of society at large to protect the age of innocence from knowledge of and contact with the more sordid aspects of life as long as possible. To minds saturated with this type of thought and feeling, Freud's doctrine of infantile sexuality was not only incredible but baseless and scandalous, or, if they felt compelled to accept it, depressing and discouraging in the extreme. They recognized that the sex-impulse when awakened in adolescence was a powerful factor in life and often involved a storm and stress which for the moment upset the balance of the moral nature; they recognized also that the sex-impulse, excited by the multifarious stimuli of the modern city, had given rise to one of the most perplexing problems of modern society; but they had cherished the belief that for a considerable stretch of years the child at least was free from the urgings of this troublesome instinct and that by the proper educational control of those years he could be reinforced against the time when the instinct should awaken and require restraint and discipline.

The Freudian doctrine of infantile sexuality, however, proposed to cut the ground from under this whole conception of the age of innocence. It virtually said that there was no age of innocence. Indeed it affirmed that the most shameful form of the sex-desire known to man, namely, incestuous desire, was the dominating element in the child's life. In the craving of the child for the mother's breast, in the drowsy satisfaction which follows suckling, in the child's love of the warmth of the mother's body and of cuddling in the mother's arms—in all these simple sensuous delights which hitherto had been ascribed to the natural desire for food, warmth and security, the Freudians read an incipient sex-desire, the root of that incest against which so many early peoples had to erect barriers of custom, law and divine prohibition. They had to admit, of course, that

the sex-craving of the child did not display itself overtly for a considerable time, from three to eight, but they explained the latent period as due to the inhibitions of society and found in its forced repressions the sources of most, if not all, of the psychoneuroses of adult life. The name by which these repressed impulses of infantile sexuality are known, viz, the Oedipus Complex, has a wide currency as though it had become established in our language once and for all, but it is a very ambiguous concept nevertheless. If suckling can explain the incestuous desire of the son for the mother, it cannot explain the incestuous desire of the daughter for the father, no does the Oedipus Complex fit in with the common fact that mothers and daughters often love one another with a tender and enduring affection. That there has been incestuous desire of the son for the mother and of the daughter for the father can hardly be denied in the face of the laws against incest in early societies but these cases can easily be explained by unwise conduct of the parents during childhood and adolescence without falling back on a dogma which outrages common sense and has so small a basis in common experience.

But our purpose here is not to point out the weaknesses of the Freudian psychology. It is merely to indicate how difficult it is for those who have been impressed by it to preserve the romantic and idealistic attitude towards human nature which was the mood of most persons of moral and spiritual culture prior to the twentieth century. Not only the Freudian doctrine of pan-sexuality but also Adler's doctrine of the ego-complex, when affirmed in their entirety, strike at the root of that democratic sentiment concerning man which was the source of so much of our best literature and of our best religion for the last hundred years.

From a quite different angle the psychology known as Behaviorism has attacked the traditional conception of human dignity. All the idealisms, whether religious or philosophical, have made much of mind, consciousness, purpose, and allied concepts. Man was supposed to be something more than his body as described by physiology. The brain was acknowledged as the physical basis of mind but it was held that in some real way, which science could not divine, the mind used the brain

for its more or less independent purposes. This mind was said to be capable of introspecting its own processes and experiences and of building up a science of psychology out of its observations and its interpretations thereof. Man was thought to be able to form ideals and to guide his conduct by means of them. Some thinkers of rare courage affirmed not only that the mind used the brain for its own ends but had actually shaped the brain in the course of evolution as the organ of its own functioning. The unity of behaviour which is so marked a characteristic of the highest human life was attributed not to some *sensorium commune* where all incoming stimuli converged but rather to the unifying activity of the mind itself. Whereas the movements of material bodies were determined in a mechanical way, that is, through their relations to external things, mind was free to determine its activity from within its own structure. From mind as a controlling, prospecting, creating, unifying activity in human life, a universal mind was inferred and projected onto the universe at large. In this way mind was divinized in the more extreme idealisms and conceived of as the source of the material universe itself.

To Behaviorism all these old idealistic attitudes towards the mind are anathema. Introspection, the older psychologist's stand-by, is repudiated and in its place is put observation of external behavior—the activities of the whole body in the outer world, and the interaction of its own parts among themselves. All the mental terms are translated, so far as possible, into physiological ones. Mind gives place to movements of nerves, muscles and glands. Thinking becomes talking to oneself and talking is an activity of the larynx. All the so-called free acts of man are merely the end-results of conditioned reflexes. Purpose or the determination of life by ideals of the mind's own construction yields its place to determination by habit or the set which the nerves, muscles and glands have received from past experience. The entire inner life of man which had been conceived by the idealistic philosophies as a sort of free enclave within the realm of physical nature is reduced to a temporary organization of responses by the organism to its environment, a mere cross-section of the environment to which all initiative belongs. The external stimulus is crowned king, consciousness,

if recognized at all, is only an ineffective epiphenomenon and the fate of man is to bow to the rule of King Stimulus as the shadow takes the shape of the object it reflects. As G. M. Lewis declares (The Anatomy of Science), "the mind is treated as a sort of minor parasite upon the body."

Whether Behaviorism is a valid account of human experience or not is not our concern now. It is enough to recall the devastating effect of it on minds that were unprepared to resist its aggressive propaganda. Behaviorism is a very different psychology from Freudianism because, while the latter is dynamic throughout and traces all human activities back to the drives of instinctive dispositions, the former puts all the dynamism into the environment. For that reason the effects of the two systems on the mind are different. Freud grants us a certain amount of initiative but assures us that we are pretty sure to use it for sensual ends; Behaviorism says less about our sensualism but tells us that we are mere puppets without any real initiative of our own and bound up with the fate of a world which is mechanical through and through.

The first enterprise of the theologian in our day must, therefore, be the formulation of such a view of human nature as shall enable us to maintain our self-esteem even if we have to accept without question the truth of the Copernican astronomy and of the evolutionary account of man's origin and also to acknowledge the possibility that Freudianism and Behaviorism have thrown considerable light on the real nature of man. It can hardly be doubted that a complete collapse of the old idealism would lead to either one of two results, each of them disastrous. When man's pursuit of ideal values is defeated he either falls back into the sense life and tries to make up in sensuous thrills for the satisfactions of the spirit or he retreats into the mood of defeatism and consoles himself for the lost values or the unachieved ideals by a poetry of imaginative and spiritual regret or a philosophy of tender melancholy, languid weariness and half-hearted despair. Matthew Arnold in the Victorian period and Joseph Wood Krutch at the present time illustrate this mood. It can hardly be doubted that either of these results would in time bring about the downfall of our civilization.

It is the purpose of the writer of this article, at a later time, to try to formulate such a view. But here it must suffice to say that until such a view can be achieved, a philosophically justified theology seems a vain enterprise. Höffding defines religion as "the conservation of values," but if values are illusory, so is religion. God has been characterized as the home of values and the guarantee of values but if values are epiphenomenal they need no home and no guarantor. An optimistic theology cannot be built today on a pessimistic anthropology.

Values and the Minister*

By Professor George R. Dodson, D. D.

In the militant days of old a great poet sang of arms and the man. In our industrial era many feel, and write about, the romance of tools and the man. My theme is values and the man—that man whom we call a minister and whose function is to give intellectual and moral leadership to our swiftly changing age. The deepest cleft known to our experience is that between the world of existence and the world of values, and the relation between them is the chief problem of philosophy. This distinction is of the first importance for religion and art as well as for philosophy. According to Prof. A. N. Whitehead, science emphasizes things but art emphasizes values, and he remarks on the blindness with which even the best men not long ago regarded the importance of aesthetics in a nation's life. He thinks that we have not yet achieved the right estimate and that this is due in part to "the scientific creed that matter in motion is the one concrete reality in nature; so that aesthetic values form an adventitious, irrelevant addition."

The minister of religion is first of all concerned with values, and the characteristic attitude of religion to the problem of their nature is fairly clear and will be set forth later, but first it seems well to consider the present state of philosophic thought on this matter. With regard to values, philosophers are divided into two schools. According to Prof. Wilbur M. Urban, there is a great divide in modern value theory. "It is between those who hold that value is a subjective addendum to reality and those who hold that it is part of the nature of anything, or indeed the essence of reality." The former regard values as our contribution to the world; meanings are determined by our own natures and are products of our own devising. This is the view of subjective idealism. According to it our interpreting is a subjective enterprise of adorning with meaning a neutral world, and value is a psychological character which the object acquires only by a relation to the liking or disliking of a sentient subject. Neither the idealists nor the realists in

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their thinking about value agree among themselves. But the former see in value something more than a subjective addition; to them it is an ultimate character of existence, part of the very nature of the object.

Between these two views there seems to be a great gulf, and Prof. Urban thinks that if philosophers can not shake hands across the great divide, still it is not wholly impassable. The one thing we seem to be sure of is that value and reality are not identical and that they are also inseparable. Prof. Urban concludes: "I hold that there can be no existence without value and no value without existence. Reality is neither mental nor material, but a realm in which thought and thing, fact and value, are inseparable, neither having any existence apart from its correlative. The acknowledgment of this relation is the condition of philosophic intelligibility. To separate value and reality leads to contradiction and unintelligibility. This much is coming to be realized, I think, by the most varied forms of philosophical thinking, by pragmatists and axiologists—by idealists, both subjective and objective; and by implication at least, even by some forms of realism. The problem of 'meaning' is fast becoming, in all quarters, the key-problem of philosophy, and it is becoming increasingly difficult to separate meaning, and its communication, from the values and their acknowledgment which meaning presupposes. Thus far thought can reach, but I am also disposed to hold that this is as far as it can at present reach. I am, moreover, inclined to think that this limit is generally realized, even if it is not explicitly admitted."

According to Prof. Hocking, if we are to philosophize at all, we must judge and believe in our power of judgment. When we postulate that things have meanings, we are putting the meanings on the same plane of objectivity with the things. Our interpretations of the world are something more than merely emotional renderings. Were they not, the question of their truth or falsity would be impertinent. He points out some of the difficulties of the subjective view. First, it would limit the possible values of the world to the measure of our desires. "We suppose that desire is first and value afterwards; whereas desire expands to the measure of the values it finds. Were

music not presented to us we should never know from the state of our untutored desires that that glory was one of the possibilities of the world. We have no reason to assume that there is any limit to the objective value of the world. . . . And finally, we limit our own effective realism, for, if the world is objectively meaningful, then it is in the most apparently meaningless and forbidding places that the greatest opportunity for the disclosure of new meanings exist. Here most of all the world asks to be understood." In this connection it is interesting to note a few words of John Dewey: "Meanings are generated and in some degree sustained by existence. Hence they can not be wholly irrelevant to the world of existence; they all have revelatory office which should be apprehended as correctly as possible. This is true of politics, religion, and art as well as of philosophy. They all tell something of the realm of existence."

Prof. J. S. MacKenzie distinguishes between value and valuations, between what has value and what we value; the latter are valuations and the former are values. The latter change, the former may be eternal. When Nietzsche spoke of the transvaluation of all values (*Umwertung aller Werte*) he referred to an alteration in valuation and not a change in the values themselves. I will indulge in one further quotation—from the late Prof. James Ward. Discussing God in relation to man and nature, he expresses himself as follows: "That the present world and progress on the plane of the present world do not and never will meet our highest needs—about this there is little question. But where in what is, in what we have so far attained, can we discern those eternal values that point upwards and beyond this present world? Surely in all that we find of the beautiful and sublime in this earth on which we dwell and the starry heavens above it; in all that led men long ago to regard nature as a cosmos; in all that is best and noblest in the annals of human life; in these very needs themselves that the seen and temporal fail to meet; and above all, in that nascent sense of the divine presence which constitutes the truly religious life, and converts faith into the *substance* of things hoped for, the *evidence* of things not seen."

It thus appears that the philosophers are divided into two

groups by a cleft almost as deep and difficult to cross as that between the realm of existence and the realm of values, and they can afford to wait. Time is long and philosophy is the intellectual enterprise of the whole human race through all time. The minister of religion, however, faces a different situation. He is the confidential and trusted adviser of men and women in the world of action. For them life is not a problem which can be held indefinitely in suspense. It is a forced option; it is a series of emergencies. Men and women are constantly compelled to act upon inadequate information. As someone has said, they can avoid making up their minds, but they can not avoid making up their lives. So that life is necessarily a venture; it is an invasion of the unknown; it is a march forward into the dark. As the Scriptures say, "We live by faith." There is a risk always that we may go wrong, but to refuse to go forward at all is fatal. It is possible that a hundred thousand years from now this problem of the relation of values to existence, of the meaning of human life, of man's place in the cosmos and his consequent duty and opportunity—it is, I say, possible that these may be cleared up, but the solution will come too late for those of us who live, do our work, and pass away in the meantime.

Now it is a striking fact that the attitude of religion at its best, of essential religion, is much the same everywhere and always. It is more positive than that of philosophy. Many have sought to express this attitude, and among the most successful was the late Prof. Paulsen. His statement is as follows: "In truth, the real essence of every religious belief is the assurance that the true nature of reality reveals itself in that which I love and reverence as the highest and best; it is the certainty that the good and perfect toward which the deepest yearning of my will is directed forms the origin and goal of all life."

How religion reaches this faith is a question which cannot be adequately discussed here. It is nearly always difficult to explain why. Some say that essential faith is a kind of instinct, that life comes believing in itself and trusting that the world in which it finds itself is one in which its ideals can be realized. Others speak of it as vision. Thus, Prof. Whitehead writes:

"The fact of the religious vision and its history of persistent expansion is our one ground for optimism. Apart from it, human life is a flash of occasional enjoyments lighting up the mass of pain and misery, a bagatelle of transient experience." Observation confirms this statement. Practically all the pessimistic publicists of the present, all the literary Cassandras, all the fluent exponents of defeatist views, are men without religion—men who regard faith as wishful thinking, and the soul's trust in cosmic support as the voice of a child crying for a dead mother.

That religion, historically, is a moral trust in reality, a belief in values and in a universe congenial to them, is explicitly admitted by an able non-theistic writer, Prof. A. E. Haydon, of the University of Chicago. He writes: "If a thousand definitions of God were assembled from all religions and from all the centuries, one thought would thread them all—man's trust that the universe in all its deepest meaning is on the side of human ideals. They represent man's brave faith that his hope of life's fulfillment will not at the last be denied. . . . The great religions were all of them absolutely certain that the good life was grounded and guaranteed in the ultimate nature of the universe." That is to say, this is what actual religion in history has been, whatever new meanings may now or hereafter be given to the word.

The relation of religion to values is concisely stated by Dean Inge in his beautiful "Confessio Fidei." He asserts that religion is the faith that gives substance to values, while philosophy aims at giving them their proper place in our harmonious scheme of existence. It is only by the path of values that we reach God at all. God is the *Valor Valorum,* the Supreme Value.

Prof. Geo. P. Adams of the University of California is convinced that we can not save this age without Christianity, and we can not save Christianity without Platonism, which is the first and still the greatest statement of the reality of values and the primacy of their position in the universe.

Thinkers in this department of philosophy are now convinced that behind the concept of meaning lies the concept of value, and that the world has a meaning has not been doubted

by any of the great philosophers, from Plato to Hegel. They are convinced that the world is ultimately intelligible and meaningful; that is to say, that values are a part of the great order and give it all the intelligibility it possesses. There have been, of course, and there are today, able and vocal representatives of another view. In their expositions the line between truth and fiction disappears, and we have a pan-fictionism. As Urban happily says: "Truth is denatured and instead of truth and falsity we have simply a problem of degrees of value among fictions." Vaihinger in Germany and Gaultier in France are representatives of this doctrine of universal fiction. The category of truth has been given up, and the category of value substituted therefor. Concepts on this theory are determined by their purpose and estimated by their fruits. To the plain American intellect this is but sophistication and sophistry, although it professes to rest upon a biological and evolutionary conception of intelligence.

The minister is concerned mainly with values. This is because his function is to be a helper of men and women, the goals of whose lives are values. The Beatitudes are explicit statements about these matters. Jesus declares that the gentle, the forgiving, the pure in heart, and those that hunger and thirst after righteousness, are blessed, and when he urges his disciples to seek first the kingdom of God and His righteousness, he is only saying that the wisdom of life is to put the highest values first and trust that the lesser goods of life will not be lacking. And Paul, in those moments when life was at the fullest and the soul at its highest stretch, taught his Philippian disciples that they should set their hearts and their affections upon the highest values, upon whatsoever is true, honorable, and just, pure, lovely, and of good report, and whatever is praiseworthy and virtuous; and he told his Galatian churches that they might know they were Christian if in their lives they manifested the fruits of the spirit, which, as he speaks of them, appear to be a list of the highest moral and spiritual values. In this connection it is interesting to reflect that religious inspiration is practically always a new vision of values and not an advance in our knowledge of the universe.

If it be asked, Should the minister, then, hold up the ideals

of truth, beauty, and goodness, and ignore the great thought constructions of his time, the answer is that this is not possible. He must, of course, avoid the mistake of basing his religious teaching on any of the scientific concepts of his age, for this reason if for no other, that science is in process of rapid development. Already Bohr's conception of the atom, which was generally accepted a few years ago, is being replaced by the conception of Schrodinger, and no physicist supposes that this last view of the nature of the atom is final.

Religion historically has always involved some world view. The traditional Christian scheme begins with the creation, as described in the first chapters of Genesis, and ends with the last judgment in the book of Revelation. The teaching of Jesus has some connection with the apocalyptic ideas of his time. It has even been contended that his ethical views were damaged by this fact. His teaching has been called "an ethics for the interim." And today, even though he be anti-theological in temper, the minister who tries to maintain spiritual morale can not avoid some attitude toward the universe. If he says we should face the world with courage, hope, and love he thereby declares that the universe is of such a character that this is our proper response to it and that is saying a great deal about the universe.

Faith in humanity and its future implies faith in the world order. We can not be cynical and skeptical about the universe and still maintain an inspiring faith in the human race, its child. Nor can we ignore this relationship. One thing is sure: —great and beautiful personalities have appeared who indisputably have their origin in the world-ground; and since nothing impersonal or subpersonal can appreciate and promote personality and its values, the thinker seems driven to the conviction that the source and support of values in the cosmos is at least personal, whatever more and other it may be.

Religion is not philosophy, yet it can not advance in entire independence of philosophy. There can be no thoughtless religion for thoughtful men. We can not live nobly without noble thoughts. And the higher life is reinforced and strengthened by a philosophy that legitimates our aspirations, and makes us feel at home in the universe.

In these exciting days, when physics and astronomy are advancing by tremendous leaps in quick succession, it is thrilling to be alive. We are in the early morning of humanity's great day. The great achievements are before us. Those who are most to be envied are the young. This is not a time to speak of finalities in thought. As Prof. Howison, of the University of California, once said to me, "Much work is yet to be done in philosophy." Those who know something of the history of the intellectual life of the race rejoice to note that thought on some of the great themes is clearing up. The fog still lingers in the valleys, but the world is grey with morning light. Doubtless it will always be so.

"Veil after veil will lift
Veil after veil will remain behind."

And because we are unable to reach finalities in our conceptions of the universe and man's place therein, life will always be a thrilling adventure. As the Socrates of the Phaedo said in the long ago—

"Fair is the prize and the hope great."

Abraham Lincoln Centre

By Dean Curtis W. Reese, D. D.

My first contacts with the liberal fellowship in 1913 brought from my predecessor in the Western Unitarian Conference secretaryship the suggestion that I might be the proper person to propose as associate with Jenkin Lloyd Jones at All Souls, Lincoln Centre, Chicago, in response to an inquiry that had recently been made for such person; but before I had an opportunity to get in touch with Dr. Jones word came that the Trustees of All Souls had not found it feasible at that time to add another member to the staff.

I then went to Alton, Illinois, and next to Des Moines, Iowa, and then eleven years ago to the secretaryship of the Western Conference, the position from which Dr. Jones himself came to All Souls. (It is amusing to note that in Des Moines we moved to Lincoln Court, then to Lincoln Place. Upon coming to Chicago we moved to Lincoln Avenue near Lincoln Park, and then to Lincoln Centre.)

Now after all these years I begin where I wanted to begin sixteen years ago, namely, as an associate of Dr. Jones at Abraham Lincoln Centre; for while the prophet founder of Lincoln Centre is no longer here in person, his spirit permeates the place and in a real sense we are associates with him.

Abraham Lincoln Centre was founded in 1905 as an experiment in democratic fellowship and service. One of the most active laymen in its founding was the late William Kent. This was the man who later as Congressman Kent said that although he possessed lands in Mexico he was unwilling to send either his boys or the boys of anybody else down to Mexico to protect his material possessions. That pacific international spirit has remained and will remain with the Centre. The pulpit of this place was once draped with the stars and stripes surrounded by the white border of peace. The founder of Lincoln Centre was chairman of the delegation on the ship of peace that sailed into the very seas of war with a message of brotherhood. A member of the Board of Trustees, Mr. Francis Neilson, wrote one of the most effective exposés of "How Diplomats Make War," and the President of the Board, Mr. S. O. Levinson, gave

to the world the "Outlawry of War," which is both an ideal and a program making possible the fulfillment of the prophecy of another son of Israel, who said, "They shall beat their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into pruning hooks."

The ideals and the programs of the Centre are socially idealistic. The faith of the Centre is that *the things that should be, can be.* Inter-racial, inter-national, inter-religious fellowship is regarded as basic, and freedom of speech and press and assembly have always been characteristic of this place. And whatever the cost, from these high ideals Lincoln Centre shall never descend.

It is not my aim to attempt a sudden revolution in the program of activities. For a while the work will proceed with much the same program as before, with only slight changes here and there. Meanwhile I shall complete my study not only of the Centre's program, but the needs of the entire community and the kinds of city-wide service that can best be rendered. But already the general outline is clear.

I.

In the first place, my ideal for Abraham Lincoln Centre is that it should be a well-balanced community centre, featuring an inter-racial program. The whole world is rapidly becoming one community. Inter-racial, inter-national, and inter-religious doings were never so general as now. To have here in Chicago a working example of what the entire world must sooner or later become, namely a real fraternity of all souls, without any discrimination whatever, would be a genuine contribution to social well-being. Increasingly it is borne in upon me that most of the social service work of the dominant race in the various countries with the minority races is not even the shadow of what it should be. Most inter-racial programs are merely playing at the task. Segregation of races in social, educational, and religious doings is in my judgment an evil of the first rank, and as such should be eradicated as rapidly as feasible. If Jew and Gentile and all other races, black and white and all other colors, cannot get along together in the free fellowship of a free community centre, then indeed is the outlook dark for the future of mankind.

The Board of Trustees has indicated its willingness to sup-

port a program featuring inter-racial activities. I, in turn, will exercise every proper caution to see that the activities planned are of basic importance, and that their execution is without sensational novelty other than that which naturally inheres in a thorough-going program of any sort.

A well-balanced community centre featuring an inter-racial program should involve at least the following departments:

(1) Department of Adult Education. In the past it has been too often assumed everywhere that an institution such as this exists only for work with children. Recently attention has been centered on the education of adults also. Educators now recognize that students should live normally while studying intensively, and that adults should study normally while living intensively. Knowledge grows and problems change. So the educational process is a life process.

Abraham Lincoln Centre will maintain a department specializing in adult education, that is, in the free inquiry by grown-up people into all aspects of life, under the leadership of competent experts. Several adult features now carried on point the way to a more extensive adult program. Last season the Tuesday evening class had a most fruitful course by Professor Burtt of the University of Chicago on "Science and Religion." These subjects, both of which come close home to everyone of us, were discussed in a free and undogmatic and yet basic manner, and questions by the class were unhampered by any loyalty prior to that of the truth. The Wednesday evening class in cooperation with the Chicago Council of Adult Education was a distinct success. The lectures by Professor Herskovits of Northwestern University on "The American Negro" were attended by an inter-racial group and were preceded by fellowship suppers. This was a real illustration of what is possible in the way of an inter-racial program. It is hoped that this experiment may be the beginning of other similar cooperative studies. The Friday Morning Forum is well known in Chicago for its intimate discussion of the most controversial subjects. Speakers as well as members of the Forum have noted the unique nature of the Friday morning meetings. This group has now come to hold substantially the place in the life of the Centre that formerly belonged to the

Tuesday Morning Class conducted by Dr. Jones. The educational features of the Mothers' Clubs also belong under the head of adult education. These adult features of our program must be extended and developed and the number of such classes increased. A by-product of this department will be the building up of the life of the Centre itself by discovering and enlisting persons of the Lincoln Centre mind who at present have no other primary institutional spiritual loyalty.

(2) A well-balanced centre should include a department of religious education, or as such departments are now frequently called, character education. In the early days of the Centre the Sunday School, as it was then almost universally called, had for that day a rather advanced curriculum, featuring especially an understanding of the ethnic religions. But in recent years this department has not operated. Such a department will be renewed under the direction of Mrs. Raymond B. Bragg, who was formerly a member of the Lincoln Centre staff and who has had such striking success in building a similar department for All Souls Church of Evanston. The curriculum will be thoroughly humanistic. It will function on the theory that all valid knowledge is religious knowledge, that all effective technique is religious method, that all worthful human interests are religious interests. This department will aim to include the ethical and social and spiritual work with children and young people which is directed toward the development of personal character and social idealism. Of course there can be no sharp line of demarcation between the various activities; that is, it cannot be said that one activity is spiritual because it deals with the non-physical, nor that another is physical because it does not deal with the so-called spiritual; but in general this department will include the work ordinarily classed as either religious or character education. It will include Sunday classes, the equivalent of a Sunday School, but it will not be confined to Sunday. Such hours and days as may be found suitable for various groups will be used. Increasingly it is found that the brief Sunday half-hour is inadequate for a thoroughgoing program of religious education. Another feature of this department will be the Sunday evening young peoples' group for discussion and social fellowship. One of our weak points,

and indeed one of the vulnerable points in church life generally, has been in not holding the interest of the young people. They must be given an opportunity to live joyously, even hilariously, in a spiritual atmosphere. Young people are going to meet somewhere under some circumstances. We expect to develop a sort of Sunday evening open house for young people. A greater service could hardly be rendered to a community like that surrounding Lincoln Centre than that of affording a wholesome environment where young people can come together for discussion, for fellowship, perhaps sometimes even for the forming of life-long affections.

(3) Department of Dramatics and Pageantry. Seeing some two years ago that we were serving children and adults in fairly large numbers but not holding the young people, we organized the department of dramatics, under the direction of a Meadville student, and this department has become a major interest of the Centre. The work has been of first rank and the dramatic group has regarded its work as of serious importance. Thus far we have not had sufficient staff to allow for the department of pageantry, but with the increasing importance that is being attached to pageantry in the schools that specialize in religious education we cannot afford much longer to neglect this way of religious and ethical development. The ethical societies, as well as many modern churches, have found in dramatics and pageantry effective ways to stimulate interest in ethical idealism. An Armistice program at the First Unitarian Church of Chicago featured the signing of the Peace Pact, and in my opinion this was a great improvement on typical ecclesiastical celebrations. The wise men of today who actually organize the world for peace are more significant for us in this age than are the wise men who followed the stars in the days of long ago.

(4) Department of Arts and Crafts. One of the standard departments of most social centres is that of arts and crafts, under this or some other similar name. In this department for the time being we are including the work previously carried on under the name of Domestic Science. It is my desire to expand this department to include more than is ordinarily thought of in this connection. Hand work, cooking clubs, and

related matters will not be under-rated; but I want this department to specialize also in developing the appreciation of the fine arts. This can be accomplished best of all by actual contacts with works of art. To this end we shall try to arrange exhibits of paintings, sculpture and the like, and conduct tours, as we are now doing to a limited extent, under competent guides to the art centres in the city. By no means the least effective way to create an interest in cultural values on the part of children whose home and community situation is unattractive is to see that Lincoln Centre is made as attractive as physical and other conditions will permit. To this end I have invited the members and the friends of Lincoln Centre to study our needs with view to improving the equipment and furnishings of the Centre.

(5) Music. One of the chief departments here has always been that of music. The chief stress has been on piano, but voice also has received attention. A committee of competent musicians, members of the Centre, is studying this department with a view to enlarging it. We have, or can have, a splendid arrangement for a considerably enhanced department of music. We have an organ, pianos, and can have suitable studio space; and in my judgment the department of music should be organized on an accredited basis that would rank the department along with the reputable schools of music in the city. And, besides, the building up of this department will greatly add to the total life of the Centre, for it is difficult to do anything of a spiritual character without the ministry of music.

(6) The organization of our recreational activities under a department known as such is a recent development, but it seems to me to be a promising arrangement. Under this department, at least for the time being, comes the work now done by both boys and girls which does not necessarily belong under recreation as such but which does possess recreational features, such as scouting, dancing, clubs, parties, games, and the like. In fact practically all of the work of the Centre is of such general nature that no hard and fast lines of demarcation can be drawn. My thought, however, is that play as such is highly worthful. Some people seem to think that play should consciously aim to prepare for something else which gives value

to the play. I think that play is its own justification. We in America have missed much of the thrill of living because we have looked with suspicion upon the gala aspects of life. Some of our European friends seem to me to get real joy from the relaxation and the exhilaration of their flower festivals and their general gala spirit. I want Lincoln Centre to make much of play and festivity and the joy of living.

(7) Athletics. Physical training and activities are valid parts of education. The old line of separation between the physical and the mental disciplines is fading out. Likewise that between liberal studies and the mastery of technique. Physical skill and rhythm react favorably on intellectual quests. Hence Lincoln Centre aims to provide a well-rounded training for the body as well as the spirit. The gymnasium, to my certain knowledge, since I live exactly under it, is used to full capacity. Indeed the dinner hour is used by groups who could not otherwise be provided for.

(8) Under the name of social service we are correlating (1) personal counsel, other than that belonging naturally to the other departments, (2) philanthropic activities, including cooperation with all available social agencies, and (3) the Clear Lake Camp. There is, of course, no other limit than that of sufficient staff to what can be done by personal counsel. By personal counsel I mean to include all that is valid in the Catholic confessional, the modern psychological and physiological clinics, and especially just good human interest and common sense. I want Lincoln Centre to be a place where both well and sick souls can come for intimate conference and sane counsel.

Nowadays no institution can live unto itself alone. The social service activities of a great city are multiple and complex. To advise with these agencies, to correlate our plans with theirs, and to cooperate in their activities will be one of the chief duties and privileges of the department of social service.

Clear Lake Camp has a charming setting. The big trees, and the long water front, and the fascinating view from the hilltop, especially when the sun is setting, all combine to make Clear Lake Camp a suitable place for recreational and educational summer activities. So far as feasible we plan to put the camp on a self-supporting basis for all who are able to pay

their way. Special funds will be used for persons whose need is real. It is a mistake, however, to think of Clear Lake Camp as primarily a charity camp. It is a recreational camp for all Lincoln Centre constituents of all stations in life.

So much for Lincoln Centre as a well-balanced community institution.

II.

Now much more briefly, Lincoln Centre as a thorough-going Humanist pulpit. A unique feature of the Centre as originally conceived was the policy of a spiritual message at the heart of a social centre. The pulpit of All Souls Church was thought of as essential to the effective functioning of the Centre. The pulpit did more than provide a stable constituency; it generated power for the entire program. I venture to say that the modern equivalent of the All Souls pulpit is an indispensable part of Lincoln Centre equipment. So believing, I shall at the earliest opportune time reinstate the pulpit feature, the Board having already so voted. It will be thorough-going in its interest in human affairs, for that is the only kind of pulpit that I could administer. It will persuasively proclaim profound convictions on human values. It will strive to stir people to the fullest and freest thought and study on all human issues. It will aim to bring about concrete action in behalf of human goals.

With this in view, and in harmony with the old statement of the function of the minister of All Souls, the Board of the Centre has defined the Dean's duties to include "the exclusive control of the pulpit." The prerequisite fundamental of spiritual progress is complete freedom of utterance for the minister in the pulpit, and complete freedom of judgment for the hearer in the pew. This policy has been won by many hard fought battles, some of them led by the founder of this institution, and the preservation of such freedom is a sacred trust.

III.

A final general classification of my conception of the work of this institution has to do with the far flung extension of the ideals for which we stand by means of printed matter in various forms, and especially through the columns of Unity.

The Boards of Directors of the Centre and of Unity are interlocking. These two institutions are so inter-related in origin, in function, and in outlook that in my judgment it is neither possible nor desirable to think of them otherwise than as one.

By tradition and policy Unity is a journal of free opinion. It is illuminating to note the careers of the men whose names appear on the first page of the first issue of the "Pamphlet Mission," which was the beginning of Unity. The first, Robert Collyer, then at Unity Church, Chicago, has become in liberal circles a symbol of spiritual nobility. He was undogmatic, magnificent in his toleration, and wide in horizon. The next is Jenkin Lloyd Jones, whose career is too well known among liberals to need extended comment from me. But let it be recorded here that he, more than anyone else, brought about the World's Parliament of Religions in 1893, which marked an epoch in the history of religion. Next in order is William C. Gannett, writer of lyrical hymns, whose sermon, "The Faith of Ethics and the Thought of God," is appraised along with the famous addresses of Channing, Emerson and Parker. Then comes Charles W. Wendte, who has devoted his life to the wider fellowship. He has recently published a two-volume work which is an authoritative record of the "Wider Fellowship." Then follows J. C. Learned, who was minister of Unity Church, St. Louis, and a man of deep insight and wide scholarship. Next, J. T. Sunderland, whose writings, particularly his "Origin and Nature of the Bible" and "The Spark in the Clod," have liberalized and mightily influenced clergymen of all faiths. His work, "India in Bondage," recently suppressed in India and republished in America, is an authoritative volume on that turbulent country. Last is George Willis Cooke, who more than most men of his generation saw the social origin and nature of religion, and who produced among other volumes a book of permanent worth on "The Social Evolution of Religion," which was recognized as a source in Wells' "Outline of History."

These were all giants in their day. Obviously the present editors have their pattern cut on a large scale.

As we move along I feel sure that the older Lincoln Centre people will sympathetically understand such differences as there may be between my ideas, convictions, and interests, and those

of the sainted founder. It is my feeling that a true follower of a great leader is not necessarily one whose ideas, and convictions, and interests are identical with his, but rather one whose ideas, convictions, and interests are in harmony with those that the great leader would probably hold were he alive today.

Naturally the issues that confront us today are somewhat different from those met by the founder of Lincoln Centre and Unity. Then the non-theistic pew was an issue; now the non-theistic pulpit. Then the religion in all religions was a major emphasis; now the religion in all life. Then the religious implications of evolution were being considered; now the religious nature of all knowledge. Then social service was a challenge; now it is social science. Then the major sociological issue was the equitable treatment of labor; now it is the democratic control of industry. Then was preached primarily the spirit of good-will; now the technique of good-will. But these new issues must be met with the same breadth of understanding, the same determination and the same ability to achieve results that characterize our spiritual forebears.

For various reasons, either inhering in their traditions or environing situations, most institutions and journals cannot "come clean" on highly controversial subjects. It is the glory of this place to be committed by both tradition and current policy to the utmost freedom of inquiry, the clearest form of expression, and the most courageous positions. Such issues as economic justice, the outlawry of war, and international relations are at home in this place. Clearly there is good reason for a program of expansion that will enable us to increase in usefulness. Honoring those who have blazed the way, respecting all who for any reason "make haste slowly," let us drive on through to the front with the whole gospel of love and justice and sane social arrangements.

A New Study of Religion

Frankness in Religion. By Robert J. Hutcheon. *The Macmillan Company.* 307 pp., 10s. 6d. net.

The name of this book is not a happy choice. It has nothing particular to do with the question of frankness. It is a very well informed, thoughtful and able study of religious ideas, objects and experiences. A book worthy to stand on your shelf with Streeter's "Reality" or W. Morgan's "The Nature and Right of Religion."

The chapters deal in a condensed fashion with such subjects as the creative source of religion, its psychological origin, mysticism, conversion, the Bible, Christ, God in modern thought, morality and its sanctions, the function of faith and immortality, from a modernist point of view. And on all of them the reader will get the fair exposition, critical discussion and judicial conclusions of a thoroughly understanding mind.

Prof. Hutcheon is a teacher in the Meadville Theological School at Chicago and his work appears to us the best of its kind that has emanated from a Unitarian seat of learning in the present century. It moves over a large field, with reference to much of the best that has been said by modern scholars; but the author's own thought organizes and vitalizes all the material.

Here you will find no dabbling in eccentricities or courting of novelties, beloved of callow egotism, but the insight of spiritual culture and the moderation of trained reason. It is to be hoped it may find its way into our public libraries and be read by representatives of other theologies who desire to know the mind of Unitarianism today and the reasons for it, as set forth by a teacher with a philosophical training.

It will also be of great value to those who are groping for a religious faith which does not rest on so-called miracles and traditional supernaturalism, but on the voice of human nature and the consent of all its faculties, which really constitute the divine revelation and the working of God in the realm of man's personality. Meadville is to be congratulated on this sound piece of religious philosophy. R. N. C.

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